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The argument that Greece was granted EEC accession




Greece joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981, however the economic crisis
experienced by the country since 2010 has led some commentators and politicians to argue that
Greece was granted accession prematurely. Eirini Karamouzi writes that while there were
legitimate objections to the country being granted membership at the time, it was a broadly sound
decision given the historical context in which negotiations took place.
The financial and economic crises that gripped Greece in 2010 set in motion a domino effect that
rattled the rest of the Eurozone. It also opened the floodgates to a seemingly endless stream of
accusations, as the contemporary press and European political elites engaged in an often myopic
blame game over the origins of the crisis. As Greek financial woes polarised opinion, former French president Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing, remembered among other things for the instrumental role he played in welcoming Greece to the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981, admitted that supporting Greek membership had been a mistake.
Possibly the most high-profile actor to make a direct link between today’s crisis and Greece’s entry into the
Community, Giscard helped to renew interest in the history of Greece and European integration. This heightened
interest from the public now calls for a deeper understanding of Greece’s relationship with Europe that must go
beyond short-term, ahistorical analyses or narratives written on the basis of hindsight.
Does the Greek crisis prove the country’s entry into the EEC in 1981 was a mistake?
The prospect of a Greek application for full membership took the EEC by surprise and presented the Community
with a host of economic, institutional and political problems. The addition of a new country, the poorest to apply so
far, was likely to severely test the Community’s institutions. Moreover, it would not merely be a question of accepting
one small country with a marginal effect on the economic balance within the Community. Rather, a favourable
response to the Greek application would very likely be followed by applications from Portugal and Spain.
To make matters more complex, the Greek application had arrived at a time of deep economic crisis that had
already put the Community model under severe strain. In 1975, just two years after the entry of Britain, Denmark
and Ireland, the Community was still clearly suffering the after-effects of the previous wave of expansion and a
British request for a renegotiation of the terms of entry. The situation was made all the more urgent by the presence
of a sudden new security dimension that had been absent during the first enlargement – namely, the imminent
danger of the Community getting embroiled in a possible Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus and the Aegean.
In these circumstances of Community stagnation and with a recently democratised, economically weak and
politically volatile applicant knocking on the door, there appeared to be a rather strong case against further
enlargement, at least in the short term. The Commission, in its lukewarm response, acknowledged such realities,
and proposed, among other things, a ten year pre-accession period. In only two weeks, the Council of Ministers, for
the first time in its history, unanimously overruled the Commission’s view. There is no dispute that the problems
outlined by the Commission did exist and that they gave the nine member states a severe collective headache. So
why did they say yes?
The contemporary press claimed that Europe’s apprehension towards Greek membership was compensated for by
the fact that no member state wanted to be seen to be opposing it. Indeed, the rhetoric of the Greeks, which
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stressed democratic norms, had made it difficult for any member state to incur the stigma of asking for a delay or
rebuffing the application, despite the evident awareness
of the problems involved.
The Greeks had capitalised on the promise of ‘Europe’
made to them by the Community during the dictatorship
(1967-1974) with the ‘freezing’ of the Association
Agreement and then again, during the transition period.
This created a dynamic in favour of a relatively rapid
Greek accession in which democratic political
considerations explicitly outweighed economic
concerns. This ‘shaming strategy’ – or, as Frank
Schimmelfennig has described it, ‘rhetorical entrapment’
– was successful in the 1970s as it spoke directly to the
Community’s attempts to establish a European political
identity. By emphasising the importance of democracy to
gaining membership, the EEC was now explicitly
articulating and configuring the fundamental
characteristics of its new identity. There could have been no better applicant than Greece, as cradle of democracy,
to foster this soul searching.
Idealism and advancement of democracy, no doubt, played a significant role in the decision to enlarge the
Community. This facet of the enlargement must, however, be placed in proper perspective given the Cold War
environment. It was of major strategic importance to promote a quick Greek membership as a means of assuring
the country’s continued adherence to the West. The nine member states knew that the Greek government had
gambled heavily on the success of its application as a major factor in the preservation of democracy in Greece and,
in turn, the country’s future foreign policy orientation.
Greece’s withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO in the midst of intense anti-Americanism in
1974 and the rise of the left in domestic politics had raised concerns about the country’s future orientation –
concerns further underlined by the possible knock-on effects in Spain, Portugal and Italy. In fact, Greece was not a
unique case within Europe: a few months earlier the Portuguese dictator Marcello Caetano had been removed by
the so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’ and power taken by a group of young radical pro-Communist Army officers.
Meanwhile in Spain, Franco’s dictatorship seemed to be nearing its end. In Italy, most significantly of all, the internal
situation had become a source of great concern for Western leaders. The country was beset by social turmoil,
economic crisis and political instability and it looked likely that the Italian Communist Party would be elected to
power.By the mid-1970s, Western interests in the southern part of Europe appeared to be increasingly under threat.
Similar to the spill-over scenarios prevalent in many assessments of the current crisis, the Greek case was never
assessed on its own merits, but as part of the Southern European puzzle. Greece’s entry into the EEC was
therefore a solution to a genuine Cold War problem. Forty years later, it is perhaps hard to recapture how genuine
and dangerous instability in Greece seemed, how near a possible war with Turkey was, and how real were the fears
of spreading the contagion of instability to neighbouring Spain, Portugal and Italy. Yet in the mid-1970s this sense of
crisis was very real indeed.
The crucially important political decision to accept Greece in the midst of crisis not only led to the Community’s
second enlargement, but added to the EEC’s collective weight on the world stage. It saw the rise of the promise of
European integration as a crucial element in Southern Europe’s successful transitions to democracy and of
enlargement as a successful foreign policy tool. Once this had occurred, it created expectations as to how the EEC
would conduct itself in the future and became a reference point for subsequent enlargements.
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While Giscard and others may say, with hindsight, that accepting Greece into the EEC was a mistake, at the time, in
those particular geopolitical circumstances, it was a sound and politically justified decision that profoundly
transformed the finalité politique of enlargement. Placing the blame for Greece’s difficulties today on its accession to
the EEC, without immersing ourselves in the history and geopolitical dynamics, is a dangerously easy conclusion to
draw.
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